Structural versus experienced complexity : a new perspective on the relationship between organizational complexity and innovation by Cara, M & Birkinshaw, J
1 
 
STRUCTURAL VERSUS EXPERIENCED COMPLEXITY:   
A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONAL COMPLEXITY AND 
INNOVATION  
 
Maya Cara 
University of Sussex 
 
Julian Birkinshaw 
London Business School 
 
 
Suzanne Heywood 
Managing Director, Exor Group 
 
 
 
Do not quote or copy without permission 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, we explore the relationship between organizational complexity and firm-level 
innovation. We define and operationalize a new construct, experienced complexity, which is the 
extent to which the organizational environment makes it challenging for decision-makers to do their 
jobs effectively.  We distinguish experienced complexity from structural complexity, which is the 
elements of the organization, such as the number of reporting lines or integrating mechanisms, that 
are deliberately put in place to help the organization deliver on its objectives, and we argue that 
structural complexity correlates positively with firm-level innovation while experienced complexity 
correlates negatively with innovation.  Using a novel dataset combining survey and objective data on 
209 large firms, we find support for our arguments.  
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INTRODUCTION 
A long-standing topic of interest in management studies is the relationship between the internal 
complexity of an organization and outputs, such as innovation, adaptability and profitability (e.g. 
Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004; Damanpour, 1996). In this paper we focus on organizational complexity, 
rather than the separate body of work on technological complexity which suggests that inventors 
might face a ‘complexity catastrophe’ when they attempt to combine highly interdependent 
technologies (e.g. Fleming and Sorenson, 2001). Organizational complexity is a function of the 
number of parts in the system and the linkages between them, but these parts “interact in a non-
simple way” (Simon, 1962: 468) and as a result complexity brings both benefits (because it enables 
organizations to do difficult things) and costs (in the form of additional coordination and oversight, 
as well as unintended consequences).  How these benefits and costs net out in practice is hard to 
specify and predict, and this helps to explain why empirical studies have generated ambiguous and 
often context-specific findings (e.g. Damanpour, 1996), and why many organizational researchers 
have used modelling techniques to improve our understanding of cause and effect in complex 
systems (Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003; Levinthal, 1997). 
Organizational complexity has also attracted considerable attention in the applied business 
literature in recent years, perhaps because of a number of high-profile failures in large, complex 
firms such as Enron, Lehman Brothers, BP and Royal Bank of Scotland. Some observers have 
suggested large firms such as Citibank are “too complex to manage” (Birkinshaw and Heywood, 
2009), the implication being that their complexity has contributed to their performance problems, 
and others have advocated various practical ways of managing their complexity (Gottfredson and 
Aspinall, 2005; Ashkenas, 2007). 
Organizational complexity, in other words, is an important contemporary phenomenon that has 
deservedly attracted research interest.  However, while much progress has been made on 
understanding the antecedents and consequences of complexity, several gaps remain.  First, our 
understanding of how complexity affects organizational outcomes is still inconclusive. Damanpour 
(1996) has showed that there are many contingencies affecting the relationship, and it is also 
possible that inconclusive results have been found because complexity is a “catch-all” construct that 
needs further specification.   Second, we know little about how complexity shapes people’s 
perceptions and behaviors in organizations.  In keeping with the burgeoning interest in 
understanding the micro-foundations of strategy and capability development (Devinney, 2013; Felin 
and Foss, 2005), we believe there is an opportunity to explore how complexity as an organization-
level construct shapes and is shaped by individual-level factors.  
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These two gaps in knowledge motivate the current study.  Rather than taking the usual firm-level 
perspective on complexity, we offer a complementary individual-level perspective, suggesting that 
complexity can also be understood as a pattern of stimuli impinging on individuals in their task 
environment (Wood, 1986: 61).  This individual-level cognitive perspective (Fioretti and Visser, 2006; 
Campbell, 1988) allows us to operationalize a new construct, experienced complexity, which is the 
extent to which the organizational environment makes it challenging for decision-makers to do their 
jobs effectively. 
Building on a combination of theoretical arguments and inductive research interviews, we make a 
conceptual split between structural complexity, which is the elements of the organization, such as 
the number of reporting lines or integrating mechanisms, that are deliberately put in place to help 
the organization deliver on its objectives (Galbraith, 1995; Tushman and Nadler, 1978), and 
experienced complexity, which is the elements of the organization, such as unclear accountabilities 
or inefficient processes, that have emerged without the approval or involvement of those at the top 
of the organization (Leibenstein, 1969) and impinge on the ability of individuals to get their work 
done effectively. 
Building on this conceptual distinction, we develop formal hypotheses linking various dimensions of 
structural and experienced complexity to firm-level innovation (as one key outcome variable), and 
we then test these hypotheses using a combination of primary questionnaire-based data (to 
measure experienced organizational complexity) and secondary data (to measure innovation) on a 
sample of 209 firms.   
The paper makes three contributions.  First, we define and operationalize a new construct, 
experienced complexity.   By looking at complexity through the eyes of an individual operating in his 
or her task environment, we shed light on aspects of the phenomenon that cannot be understood 
using firm-level data alone.   Our approach therefore complements the existing firm-level 
perspective that is dominant in the literature (Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004; Damanpour, 1996), and 
thereby opens up some interesting new avenues for investigation. 
Second, our empirical analysis shows that experienced complexity and the more traditional notion of 
structural complexity have different outcome effects, with structural complexity correlating 
positively with firm-level innovation, and experienced complexity correlating negatively with 
innovation. This is an important finding, because it helps to explain some of the inconclusive 
empirical evidence in prior studies, and it allows us to develop new theory about the relationship 
between complexity and organizational performance.   
4 
 
Finally, our paper offers a new perspective on an important practical challenge in the world of 
business.  Many large firms today, in such industries as banking, pharmaceuticals and oil and gas, are 
highly complex, and observers have argued that this complexity has contributed to well-publicized 
management failures such as the financial crisis and BP’s spill in the Gulf of Mexico.  This paper 
provides a useful starting point for helping firms to decompose their activities into those that create 
intended (and potentially useful) complexity versus those that create unintended (and potentially 
harmful) complexity, which in turn could steer them towards making improvements in their 
organizational arrangements in the future. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
There are two distinct bodies of research on organization-level complexity, with one body focused 
primarily on the relationship between structural features of organizations (such as size and 
formalization) and organization-level outcomes such as innovation and performance, and the other 
built on insights from complexity science to show how order emerges from the interaction of the 
many constituent parts of an organization.  
The original studies of organizational complexity were conducted in the 1970s, and they 
operationalized complexity in terms of the various dimensions of differentiation (spatial, 
occupational, hierarchical, and functional) as well as firm size (Miller and Contay, 1980; Beyer and 
Trice, 1979; Hall, 1977; Blau, 1970).  Consistent with the open systems view of organizations, the 
overarching proposition behind these studies was that organizations should be designed to match 
the complexity of the environment in which they were operating (Galbraith, 1982; Thompson, 1967). 
However, the results of these studies were not entirely conclusive. For example, in a meta-analytic 
review, Damanpour (1996) showed that structural complexity and size were both positive predictors 
of firm-level innovation, but with many contingency factors affecting these relationships.  
The second wave of organization-level research, building on the theory of complex adaptive systems, 
showed that complexity is not just a function of the diversity of elements that make up a system, it is 
also affected by the interdependencies between those elements (Axelrod and Cohen, 2000; 
Anderson, 1999; Levinthal, 1997; Simon, 1962;).  A few studies have shown how real-life 
organizations exhibit many of the non-linear outcomes predicted by complexity theory (e.g. Brown 
and Eisenhardt, 1998; Browning et al, 1995). The majority have adopted modelling techniques to 
play out the likely consequences of simple behavioural rules for organization-level innovation, 
adaptability and long-term success (Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003; Levinthal, 1997).  For example, one 
set of studies showed that tightly coupled organizations cannot engage in exploration without 
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foregoing the benefits of exploitation (Rivkin, 2000; Levinthal and Warglien, 1999). An optimal level 
of complexity is thus achieved by more loosely coupled organizations which can exploit the fruits of 
past wisdom while exploiting alternative bases of future viability (Levinthal, 1997).  
While different in many important respects, these bodies of research share a view of complexity as 
an attribute of the organization as a whole.  For the earlier researchers in the 1970s, complexity was 
essentially a structural quality of the organization, the result of a set of choices made by the firm’s 
top executives about its size and scope, and its formal structures and systems.  For the more recent 
wave of research, complexity was an emergent property of the organization, the result of many 
lower-level agents interacting together in ways that created unpredictable outcomes.  
But even though considerable progress has been made through these studies, there remain several 
significant gaps in our knowledge.  First, the empirical evidence for how complexity affects 
organizational outcomes is inconclusive. As Damanpour (1996) showed, the relationship is at best a 
contingent one, that is, it varies according to various external and internal factors. It is also possible 
that the inconclusive results have been observed because complexity is a “catch-all” construct that 
needs further specification. For example, firm size, one important dimension of complexity, has been 
argued to affect innovation positively because it creates slack, strong technical capabilities and 
tolerance of failure (Dewar and Dutton, 1986; Kimberly and Evanisko, 1981), but it has also been said 
to inhibit innovation because it is associated with formal rules and standards (Hitt et al, 1990; Hage, 
1980).  Similarly, formal rules have been shown to have both coercive and enabling qualities (Adler 
and Borys, 1996). 
Second, we know surprisingly little about how complexity actually shapes the way people behave in 
organizations.  There have been many recent calls for studies of the “micro-foundations” of 
organizations, on the basis that organization-level constructs, such as complexity, capability or 
strategy, are shaped by the actions of individuals, and then in turn shape the way those individuals 
process information and act (Devinney, 2013; Powell and Colyvas, 2008; Felin and Foss, 2005; 
Whittington, 1996). While the recent complexity literature has done a good job of modelling higher-
level outcomes as a result of lower-level actions, the reverse causal link has not been explored. We 
believe this is a missed opportunity.  We still know very little about how complexity affects the 
perceptions and behaviours of individuals within organizations.  
These limitations suggest that a fruitful line of inquiry would be to look more closely at the nature of 
organizational complexity as it is perceived and acted on by individuals. To do this, it is useful to 
briefly review the individual-level literature on complexity. 
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Individual-level research on complexity 
The behavioural literature on task complexity is primarily concerned with understanding how the 
nature of the task affects an individual’s performance and job satisfaction.  For example, Wood 
(1986: 60) described how the essential components of a task are its products, required acts and 
information cues, and depending on how these are put together the task will be more or less 
complex.  He also derived three dimensions of task complexity: component complexity, coordinative 
complexity and dynamic complexity.  Campbell (1988) identified four different perspectives through 
which task complexity could be understood, and he used these to derive a typology of complex 
tasks. He also distinguished between objective and experienced complexity. Several further studies 
built on these ideas, primarily around understanding the fit between the complexity of a job and the 
skills and values of the individual doing it (e.g. Shaw and Gupta, 2004; Wilk and Sackett, 1996; 
Hunter, Schmidt and Judiesch, 1990). 
The important insight emerging from the task complexity literature is that how an individual 
experiences the complexity of their task is a function of three interrelated factors: (a) the intrinsic 
complexity of the task itself, (b) the capacity and motivation of the individual to cope with 
complexity, and (c) the level of complexity of the task environment in which the individual is 
working.  While these three factors are very hard to separate empirically, they are conceptually 
distinct. And for our purposes in this paper it is the third factor, namely, the complexity of the task 
environment that is relevant. Complexity, according to this view, is the “pattern of stimuli impinging 
on the individual” (Wood 1986: 61), and the implication is that some organizations create greater 
complexity through the various information cues experienced by the individual, than others.  
The notion that the complexity of the organization shapes the way individuals process information 
and behave is well established in other bodies of organization theory.  For example, in the literature 
on managerial cognition, organizations are viewed as interpretive systems in which individuals 
create meaning and action from the stimuli they receive from other parts of the organization (Daft 
and Weick, 1984; Weick, 1979).  And according to the attention based view (Ocasio, 1997; 2011), 
individuals face more information and stimuli than they can process as bounded-rational individuals, 
so one of the things executives do is to create structures that seek to focus the attention of 
individuals on salient issues. In our terms, then, organizations can to some degree manipulate the 
amount of complexity people are exposed to, and this in turn affects their ability to carry out their 
tasks effectively. 
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In sum, these and other studies concerned with individual-level cognition and behaviour help to 
elucidate what organizational complexity feels like “in practice” which is potentially a useful way of 
advancing our understanding of the phenomenon (Felin and Foss, 2005; Whittington, 1996). It is 
recognized that some tasks are inherently more complex than others, and some individuals are more 
able to soak up complexity than others.  But in addition to these factors, the way an organization is 
designed and managed has a substantial effect on the level of complexity an individual experiences.  
We therefore propose to develop further Campbell’s (1988) concept of “experienced complexity” 
which refers to how those working in the organization experience it, rather than its structural 
features.   
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
As already discussed, organization theory has traditionally treated complexity as a structural 
variable, and as an attribute of the organization as a whole.  More formally, organizational 
complexity can be defined as the extent to which an organization has multiple diverse parts and 
interdependencies between those parts. This definition builds on Simon (1962) and is consistent 
with the “NK modelling” approach in organization science (Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin and Siggelkow, 
2003) where complexity is the product of the variety of elements and the level of linkages between 
elements. 
We believe it is useful to develop a complementary construct, experienced organizational 
complexity, which is important because it affects the way that individual decision-makers do their 
jobs.  As Fioretti and Visser (2006) note, complexity increases the demands on individual decision 
makers through a cognitive process, i.e. through how those decision makers interpret and make 
sense of the stimuli they received (Weick, 1979). And as Simon (1962: 481) notes, “how complex or 
simple a structure is depends critically upon the way in which we describe it.” It is therefore the 
“experienced” nature of organizational complexity that potentially is as important as its objective 
qualities. Our formal definition is as follows: 
Experienced Organizational Complexity is the extent to which the organizational environment makes 
it challenging for decision makers to do their jobs effectively. 
This definition has three components. First, it refers to aspects of the “organizational environment” 
that impinge on what individuals do, rather than aspects of their specific job or skill-set (Wood, 
1986). Experienced complexity is, in other words, an attribute of the organization as a whole, even 
though it can only be measured through the perceptions of those working in it.  Second, complexity 
from the point of view of decision-makers is anything that makes it more challenging for them to do 
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their jobs effectively, i.e. requiring of additional effort on their part.  Third, no assumptions are made 
in this definition regarding the consequences of complexity for the performance of the organization: 
It is an empirical question whether experienced complexity affects organizational outcomes in a 
positive or negative way. 
As a next step in our theoretical development, we develop further the conceptual distinction 
between experienced complexity and the more traditional notion of structural complexity.   
Structural complexity is the elements of the organization that were deliberately put in place by those 
at the top of the organization to help deliver on its objectives.  These are the fundamental elements 
of organization design (Galbraith, 1995; Tushman and Nadler, 1978; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967), 
such as the number of products or markets, the number of reporting lines, and the use of integrating 
mechanisms to enable cross-unit coordination.  On the basis that structure follows strategy 
(Chandler, 1962), these can be viewed as strategic choices made by top executives to deliberately 
create complexity as a way of servicing multiple customers in multiple markets.   
Experienced complexity is the elements of the organization that have arisen without the approval or 
involvement of those at the top. This is a harder construct to measure, because by definition it is an 
emergent, rather than designed, property of the organization. The first phase of our empirical 
research (described below) involved semi-structured interviews with decision-makers in many 
different firms, and they observed that “complexity is like cholesterol – it has bad and good forms.”  
When pushed further, they pointed to such things as poorly-implemented IT systems, ill-defined 
responsibilities, overlapping roles, rigid procedures, and so on.  These might be viewed simply as 
examples of inefficient management practices, but they are nonetheless important facets of 
complexity in terms of what decision makers actually experience in their organizations (and are 
therefore an integral part of the phenomenon).   
Experienced complexity is a relatively new construct in the literature on organizations, but there are 
several analogous concepts that help to clarify its meaning.  For example, organizational slack is 
known to have both positive and negative manifestations (Singh, 1986; Bourgeois, 1981), 
bureaucracy has been shown to have both enabling and coercive properties (Adler and Borys,1996), 
and corporate oversight of business units both creates and destroys value in those units (Goold, 
Campbell and Alexander, 1994). In all these cases, a structural attribute (slack, bureaucracy, 
corporate oversight) that is intended to provide benefits also brings certain costs that tend to coexist 
with it. And these costs are particularly salient when studied from an individual-level perspective. As 
Adler and Borys (1996: 66) note in their study of bureaucracy, “surely employees’ attitudes to 
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formalization depend on the attributes of the type of formalization with which they are 
confronted?”   
There is also a considerable amount of evidence in the literature that inefficient management 
practices or X-inefficiencies (Leibenstein, 1966) are more prevalent than might be predicted by 
economic theory. Bloom and van Reenen (2007), for example, have recently documented substantial 
differences in the quality of management practices even among seemingly similar enterprises, and 
evidence is amassing that these differences often endure over time, even after they have been 
identified (Syverson, 2011). 
In sum, , we believe one useful way forward in the study of organizational complexity is to look at 
complexity from the perspective of the decision makers in the organization, through a construct we 
are calling “experienced complexity” which potentially complements the more established construct 
of “structural complexity.”    
Hypotheses 
To push our understanding of organizational complexity forward, it is useful to develop and test 
some hypotheses that follow from the conceptual arguments developed above. Many possible 
questions arise from our novel conceptualization, such as the extent to which “experienced” and 
“structural” complexity overlap, the antecedent conditions that cause experienced complexity, and 
the mechanisms by which it shapes important organizational consequences.  In the interests of 
keeping the scope of this paper manageable, we make progress in two ways. First, we develop an 
operational measure of experienced complexity, using a combination of deductive and inductive 
methods. Second, we conduct a simple empirical test of the relationship between experienced and 
structural complexity on the one hand, and firm-level innovation on the other.  We focus on 
innovation because it has been the most commonly used dependent variable in the complexity 
literature (Damanpour, 1996), and it fits well with our theoretical arguments about the challenges 
and opportunities involved in creating new combinations (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Schumpeter, 
1934). Nonetheless, we recognize that other output measures are also relevant, and we consider 
several of them in our robustness checks towards the end of the paper.  
Our basic theoretical argument for the link between complexity and innovation works as follows. 
The organization is conceptualized as a task environment that stimulates decision-makers to act in 
certain ways, through a combination of structural and contextual cues of varying complexity (Gibson 
and Birkinshaw, 2004; Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1994; Burgelman, 1983).  These cues are then sensed by 
decision makers, which in turn shapes the way they act individually and collectively (Ocasio, 2012; 
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Weick, 1979). These actions, in turn, drive a number of organization-level outcomes, such as 
innovation.  Of course, we do not actually measure the individual and collective actions of decision-
makers: instead, we measure how they experience the various cues from the task environment, and 
we correlate these elements of complexity with firm-level innovation (see Figure 1). So we are not 
able to explicate the underlying mechanisms by which complexity affects innovation, but we still 
move a step closer than was possible using traditional methods that ignored individual-level 
perceptions. 
Figure 1.  Conceptual Framework 
             Organizational Complexity 
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The structural elements of complexity that are put in place, or “designed” by executives, have been 
conceptualized in prior research as the variety of elements in the system (e.g. number of lines of 
business or countries) and the interdependencies between those elements (e.g. multiple reporting 
lines or cross-cutting processes; Levinthal, 1997). We expect both these sets of factors to have a 
significant bearing on the way decision makers interpret their task environment.  
Consider the variety of elements first. There is an established line of argument in the innovation 
literature that says innovation occurs through the combination of existing and new knowledge 
(Schumpeter, 1942), and therefore an important capability for firms seeking to succeed  in 
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1999; Saxenian, 1990;), academic and government labs (Cohen et al., 2002), linkages with partner 
firms (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Powell et al., 1996; Gulati, 1995), and relationships with suppliers and 
customers (Dyer, 1994; Day, 1990; von Hippel, 1981).  The knowledge these relationships give access 
to is then used by the firm, in combination with its existing knowledge, to create new outputs. In 
addition, gaining access to a larger knowledge base may also enhance a firm’s absorptive capacity, 
which in turn makes it easier for future opportunities to be recognized and incorporated (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990).  
This line of argument applies in a straightforward way to our conceptual framing. Specifically, the 
level of variety that individual decision makers experience themselves is likely to have a direct effect 
on their motivation and capacity to innovate.  By being exposed to insights from different parts of 
the organization, individuals are likely to generate new ideas of their own; they are also likely to 
encounter others with whom they can potentially work, so that promising ideas can be developed 
into meaningful innovations.  We therefore propose the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1. The relationship between the variety of elements within a chosen organizational 
design and firm-level innovation is positive.  
Moving on to the interdependencies between elements, we also expect this relationship with firm-
level innovation to be broadly positive. The existence of variety, in terms of access to new sources of 
knowledge, is necessary for innovation to transpire but it is unlikely to be sufficient. New outputs 
typically involve recombining existing elements of knowledge into new combinations (Fleming, 1999; 
Kogut and Zander, 1992; Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Schumpeter, 
1934), and for these new combinations to transpire, it is necessary for the firm to develop 
mechanisms and processes that enable the disparate parts of the firm to collaborate together 
(Galbraith, 1995).   
Again, this broad argument applies directly to our conceptual framework. Interdependencies 
manifest themselves as a array of formal and informal linkages between people in an organization, 
and to the extent that these exist, and are perceived to be impinging on the day-to-day work of 
decision makers, they will enable the necessary levels of collaboration that make innovation possible 
(Hansen, 2009; Szulanski, 1995). For instance, common interfaces such as integration teams in case 
of mergers, meetings within and between the R&D units of different business units, and extensive 
face-to-face communication with customers and suppliers all enable decision makers to learn about 
each other’s technology and processes (Gerpott, 1995), which in turn is likely to support the 
development of new combinations.  In sum, we proposed the following hypothesis:  
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Hypothesis 2.  The relationship between interdependencies within a chosen organizational design 
and firm-level innovation is positive. 
Experienced complexity 
In contrast to structural complexity, the notion of experienced complexity is relatively undeveloped.  
As noted above, it emerged from the exploratory interviews we conducted at the start of this 
research project.  When we asked top executives about the sources of complexity in their 
organisations, they focused on external constraints (e.g. new legislation) and structural factors (e.g. 
a matrix structure).  But when we asked people three to four levels down, the sources of complexity 
they talked about were such things as the clarity (or not) of their reporting lines, their accountability 
for specific activities, and the efficiency (or not) of internal processes.  And often their views did not 
correspond to the high-level expectations of top executives: some individuals in objectively-complex 
roles appeared to be operating without difficulty, while others whose roles looked much simpler 
expressed great concern about how difficult it was to get anything done.  
These insights helped us to conceptualize the notion of experienced complexity, which we define as 
the elements of the organization that have arisen without the approval or involvement of those at 
the top, and that collectively make it difficult for people to get their work done. This notion that 
there are de facto complexities in many large organizations that compromise internal efficiency has 
been noted in several strands of literature (e.g. Bloom and van Reenen, 2007; Adler and Borys, 1996; 
Leibenstein, 1966; Perrow, 1972; Senge, 1990).  However, our arguments here are more speculative 
than those for structural complexity. 
Organizations are socio-technical systems in which outcomes are determined by a combination of 
technical expertise in designing a set of processes and components that yield desirable outputs and 
social or managerial expertise in generating the necessary level of motivation and cooperation 
between people (Emery and Trist, 1965; Senge. 1990; Trist and Bamforth, 1951).  While certain 
activities (such as manufacturing pre-designed products) can be specified and managed primarily 
through technical expertise, other activities require a considerable amount of individual discretion 
and high levels of motivation. Innovation is certainly one of these activities, which suggests that a 
great deal of attention needs to be paid to the social or managerial elements of the organization for 
it to work effectively. 
For medium-sized or large organizations (which is our sampling frame in this study), there are formal 
structures and processes that both enable and constrain individuals in how they work (Adler and 
Borys, 1996).  Such structures constrain individuals in a number of different ways. First, they are 
13 
 
often tightly-coupled, so that a small problem in one part of the system can have unpredictable 
knock-on effects later (Senge, 1990; Perrow, 1984). Second, they are often imperfectly 
implemented, because of the bounded rationality and limited attention capacity of the individuals 
responsible for them (Ocasio, 2012; Cyert and March, 1963), and this can hamper communication 
and coordination across disparate parts of the organization.  Third, these constraining features are 
also likely to reduce the intrinsic motivation of decision makers, and limit the extent to which they 
use their discretionary time and effort in a way that helps others; all of which is likely to hinder the 
overall innovation efforts of the firm.    
To take our theorizing one step further, it is useful to distinguish conceptually between the vertical 
and horizontal dimensions of the organization, and to suggest that experienced complexity can arise 
on both dimensions.  The vertical dimension consists of the hierarchical division of the whole into its 
constituent parts (Hedlund, 1994; Simon, 1962), and the allocation of responsibilities to individuals 
at each level (Jacques, 1989). When this formal structure is implemented effectively, individuals 
understand what they are accountable for and how their performance will be evaluated.  However, 
when it is not, there are often overlapping accountabilities and unclear lines of reporting, which 
requires additional effort to manage.  In addition, there are often “turf wars” between units and 
engagement levels of employees tend to suffer (Brunsson, 2000; Crozier, 1969), all of which will 
have a detrimental effect on the effective functioning of the organization. 
In terms of the link to innovation, unclear accountabilities are likely to have two negative 
consequences for individual decision makers: first, they will feel constrained in their own work, 
because there is a lack of clarity about who is responsible for what outputs, and that will limit the 
level of collaboration between individuals; second, they will be less motivated to put in the 
discretionary and creative effort that often lies behind innovation (Kahn et al, 1964; Pearce, 1981). 
Taken together, we therefore expect that unclear accountabilities will be associated with lower firm-
level innovation.  
Hypothesis 3. The relationship between (perceived) unclear accountabilities and firm-level 
innovation is negative.  
The horizontal dimension refers to the cross-cutting processes through which work is done in large 
organizations, for example the budgeting process or the order fulfilment process (Davenport, 1993; 
Hammer, 1990).  Horizontal processes are managed through formal procedures, and are one of the 
defining qualities of bureaucracy (Gouldner, 1954; Weber, 1946). In most large organizations today, 
they are also automated and standardized to a large degree using Information Technology systems. 
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When they function effectively, horizontal processes can be enablers of efficiency and productivity, 
but when they are not they tend to constrain and frustrate employees because they take away 
individual discretion (Adler and Borys, 1996).  To the extent that processes are experienced by 
decision-makers in the organization as inefficient, we expect they will become a distraction.  
Decision-makers will therefore end up focusing their discretionary effort on resolving these 
problems, rather than on the more value-added and creative aspects of their job such as innovation.  
Thus we predict a negative relationship with innovation: 
Hypothesis 4. The relationship between (perceived) inefficient processes and firm-level innovation is 
negative.  
In sum, we propose four direct relationships between elements of organizational complexity and 
firm-level innovation, two positive and two negative.  It should be noted that we do not specify any 
interaction effects or quadratic relationships here because our understanding of the organizational 
complexity construct is still very limited.  We do however conduct some post hoc analysis below to 
explore whether there are any significant interactions or quadratic relationships in our data. 
METHODOLOGY 
To test our arguments about organizational complexity, we needed to build a body of data that 
provided systematic insight into how decision-makers viewed the internal complexity of their firms, 
which by its nature is not available from public sources. We therefore employed a multi-stage 
process to develop and administer a survey instrument to executives in a sample of large 
international firms.  The findings from this survey were then used, alongside objective firm-level 
data, to test our hypotheses. 
Sample 
We worked with an international advisory company to develop a sample of large firms operating in 
multiple industries and multiple countries. Our selection criteria were: (a) activities in more than one 
country and/or industry, to ensure their operating environment was at least moderately complex, 
(b) industries with significant global competitors, to rule out highly-protected and/or locally-focused 
industries, (c) at least 1000 employees, to exclude small and medium sized enterprises that often 
have different managerial and organizational characteristics to large firms, and (d) a stock market 
listing, to give us access to public-source data.  
We sent our survey to a random sample of 1000 firms within this sampling frame, and after 
excluding responses with missing data, and those where the respondent was more than four levels 
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from the top of the company, we ended up with 209 usable responses, a response rate of 21%. This 
compares favourably with typical response rates for large-sample international business surveys 
(Harzing, 1997). Table 1a provides descriptive data for the sample of firms while Table 1b provides 
an overview of respondents’’ characteristics that are available from the survey. We analysed the 
differences between respondents and non-respondents on measures of size, industry, country of 
origin, and performance, and no significant differences were uncovered. The survey was completed 
in 2006. 
----------Table 1a and Table 1b---------- 
To generate responses across a meaningful sample of companies, we elected to use key informants 
in senior positions whose answers were deemed to be representative of the firm they were working 
for (Seidler, 1974). This approach is widely used in management research and has been found to be 
reliable (Crampton and Wagner, 1994).  However, we needed to take additional care because our 
core construct of experienced organizational complexity was new and, like other constructs such as 
organization culture or customer orientation, subjective in its nature. We therefore took the 
following precautions. First, we tested the survey in a cross-sectional group of 25 decision-makers in 
an international resources firm to see how much variation there was in their responses.  The average 
standard deviation per question (on a 5-point scale) was 0.46, suggesting a reasonable degree of 
convergence in their views. Second, for a third of the sample we got survey responses from a second 
senior executive, and the inter-rater reliability across the pairs of executives within the same firm 
was r=0.81, well above the suggested cut-off point of r=0.70 (Cohen et al, 2003).  Note that in the 
actual analysis, we used the more senior executive as the key informant (rather than the average of 
the ratings from the two executives) because we needed to control for certain individual-level 
factors in our regression models.  
The survey focused on both structural and experienced complexity, and in addition it had questions 
about the firm’s capacity to manage complexity and its overall performance. To avoid concerns 
about common-method bias, this paper uses the survey findings for the four independent variables 
and some of the control variables while using the secondary lagged data on innovation (patents) as 
our main dependent variable.  
Measurement Approach 
One of the key challenges in this study was the lack of existing measures for organizational 
complexity. We therefore used a grounded, three-step approach to define and operationalize this 
construct. First, we conducted interviews with 12 senior executives working in large firms, and we 
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asked what organizational complexity meant to them in practice, and how it affected their ability to 
deliver on various firm-level objectives. The primary orienting question we asked them was:  What 
are the aspects of the organizational environment in which you work that make it challenging for you 
to do your job effectively?  By asking the question in this open-ended way, we were able to group 
their answers into various categories and to develop an inductive operationalization of 
organizational complexity.  This approach led to the identification of the four constructs, (1) variety 
of elements (2) interdependencies between elements, (3) unclear accountabilities and (4) inefficient 
processes.  
Second, we assembled a group of six experts, a mix of academics, practitioners and consultants, to 
review the provisional scales. This process allowed us to refine our chosen measures, and it helped 
us to link our inductively-generated constructs back to the academic literature.  For example, this is 
where we linked the “variety of elements” and “interdependencies” survey items back to the 
structural complexity literature.  We also identified a set of external factors, such as the level of 
regulation in the industry, which are used in this paper as control variables. Third, we pilot-tested 
our provisional list of measures with a further 12 executives, allowing us to fine-tune the wording 
and to drop those items that did not work.  
As a result of this process, we ended up with a four-factor model that fitted the data reasonably 
well: Comparative fit index (CFI) = 0.90, root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA) = 0.053 
and Chi-squared test = 0.00.  All item loadings were as proposed and significant (p < 0.01). We also 
explored two alternative 3-factor models: (a) with unclear accountabilities and inefficient processes 
bundled under the concept of experienced complexity, and (b) with variety of elements and 
interdependencies bundled under the concept of structural complexity.   Results for these models 
did not fit the data as well as the four-factor solution: for model (a) comparative fit index (CFI) = 
0.72, root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA) = 0.057 and Chi-squared test = 0.00; for 
model (b) comparative fit index (CFI) = 0.69, root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA) = 
0.053 and Chi-squared test = 0.00. 
To measure innovation, we followed the well-established practice of using the number of published 
patents as an objective indicator of innovative activity (e.g. Scherer, 1984). Patents have long been 
recognized as a very rich and potentially fruitful source of data for the study of innovation, as (1) 
they are directly related to inventiveness, and are granted only for ‘non obvious’ improvements or 
solutions with discernible utility; (2) they represent an externally validated measure of technological 
novelty (Griliches, 1990); (3) they confer property rights upon the assignee and therefore have 
economic significance (Scherer and Ross, 1990; Kamien and Schwartz, 1982). Patents also correlate 
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well with other measures of innovative output, such as new products (Comanor and Scherer, 1969), 
innovation and invention counts (Achilladelis et al., 1987), and sales growth (Scherer, 1984). Patents 
also have their limitations as measures, as some inventions are not patentable, others are not 
patented, and the inventions that are patented differ greatly in economic value (Griliches, 1990; 
Trajtenberg, 1990; Cohen and Levin, 1989). Nonetheless, on balance we decided that patent-based 
measures of firm-level innovation were superior to other options available for the current study. 
Until recently, the NBER database on U.S. patents has been the most reliable source of patents used 
by researchers. This database comprises detailed information on almost 3 million U.S. patents 
granted between 1963 and 2006, all citations made to these patents between 1975 and 2006, and a 
reasonably broad match of patents to Compustat. However, it presented several drawbacks for our 
research. First, it covers only U.S. patents which is a major limitation for our study, since more than a 
third of the firms in our sample are non U.S. companies. Second, the database stops covering the 
patents granted after 2006.  Third, the reasonably broad match of patents to Compustat presents 
significant problem given our multi-country sample.  
To overcome these problems, we collected a comprehensive dataset of worldwide patenting data 
for the 209 firms in our sample using the Thomson Innovation database. To our knowledge, this 
database covers the largest number of patenting jurisdictions in addition to using the most up-to-
date corporate tree. Furthermore, to take in account that firms in the sample publish patents under 
the names of multiple subsidiaries (e.g. Schneider Electric patents under the names of 11 
subsidiaries), as well as change their names over time (e.g. ‘Motorola Inc.’ changed its name to 
‘Motorola Solutions’ in 2010) we use the corporate tree provided by Thomson Innovation while 
complimenting it with the information on restructuring from firms’ 10k reports in the period from 
2006 to 2010. This way we build a world-wide patenting database for the firms in our sample 
avoiding most of the limitations previously mentioned.  
Measures  
Innovation output (the dependent variable) was measured through the patenting frequency of firms, 
that is, the number of successful patent applications by a firm in a given year. We measured 
innovation output as a lagged variable, i.e. the number of patents applied for in 2007, i.e. one year 
after the survey was completed.  We also measured the patent applications two, three and four 
years after the survey, and we report the results in the robustness tests.   
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To be more specific, we measured the number of successful patent applications, or granted patents1. 
The granted patent carries the date of the original application. We use this date to assign a granted 
patent to the particular year when it was originally applied for. Some previous researchers claim that 
the actual timing of the patented inventions is closer to the application date than to the 
(subsequent) grant date (Hall et al. 2001). This is so because inventors have a strong incentive to 
apply for a patent as soon as possible following the completion of the innovation, whereas the grant 
date depends upon the review process at the Patent Office.  Therefore, our procedure permits 
consistency in the treatment of all patents and controls for differences in delays that may occur in 
granting patents after the application is filed (Trajtenberg, 1990).  
We also used three other measures related to innovation as robustness checks – lagged sales 
growth, which is frequently discussed as a consequence of innovation, perceived value-added, which 
was measured using the questionnaire and citations, which represent the value of the patent. We 
report these results separately as a way of providing additional support to our main arguments. 
Variety of elements (structural complexity) is a measure of the scope of activities the firm is involved 
with. Respondents were asked the following questions: (1) How many different direct customers you 
have across all operations and business units? (2) How many products and services do you supply? 
(3) How many different suppliers do you have? (4) How many countries do you operate in? (5) How 
many industries do you conduct business in? (6) How many ways of making money – business 
models – there are in your organization? (7) How many M&A has the company made in the last 15 
years? (8) How many joint ventures and alliances has the company made in the last 15 years?  To 
ensure that these eight items were weighted approximately equally, each question had a range of 
possible answers arranged on a five-point scale.  
Organizational variety is a formative construct, that is, it derives its meaning from the combined 
influence of all its constituent items (Bollen, 1989; Mackenzie, Podsakoff and Jarvis, 2005). There is 
no reason, for example, to expect a firm with many direct customers to also make a large number of 
acquisitions, yet they both increase the overall level of variety. For this reason, it is not appropriate 
to calculate a reliability measure, such as Cronbach’s Alpha, in the way one would if dealing with a 
reflective construct.  Instead, we report on whether the measures are consistent with our 
theoretical understanding of these constructs using a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (see earlier 
discussion). 
                                                          
1
 We chose not to use the data collected on the citations of patents given that, on average, it takes 
approximately 10 years for a patent to receive 50 percent of its citations and we are focusing on the 2006-
2010 period in our analysis.   
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Interdependencies (structural complexity) is the extent to which disparate parts of the firm are 
brought together for the purposes of decision making. Respondents were asked the following 
questions: (1) To what degree decisions require input from multiple business units within the 
company? (2) To what extent does your organization use matrix structures, which force employees 
to respond simultaneously to multiple, potentially conflicting, decision premises? (3) To what extent 
do senior managers in your company have multiple reporting lines? (4) To what extent does your 
company have multiple dimensions of equal importance at the top management level? (1-disagree 
completely, 5=agree completely).  As above, we conceptualize interdependencies as a formative 
construct, in that different firms will typically use different mechanisms for building 
interdependencies between elements (Galbraith, 1973), so we would not expect uniformly high or 
low scores on these questions. 
Unclear accountabilities (experienced complexity) are vertical arrangements in the organization that 
that unintentionally make it more challenging for decision makers to do their jobs effectively. 
Respondents were asked to rate the following statements: (1) Accountabilities are often shared in 
the company, so it is frequently unclear who is responsible for what (2) There is significant 
duplication of activities across the organizations (3) Target objectives are poorly defined (4) Financial 
rewards are not clearly tied to targets (1-disagree completely, 5=agree completely).   
Inefficient processes (experienced complexity) are horizontal arrangements in the organization that 
unintentionally make it more challenging for decisions makers to do their jobs effectively. 
Respondents were asked to rate the following statements: (1) Management processes are 
inefficient, unclear and require more info (2) Operating processes are inefficient, unclear and require 
more info (3) The company is not very integrated. Systems and processes are not interlinked, use 
different data and run on different timetables (4) The IT systems are ineffective; they are overly 
complex and do not keep pace with company development (1-disagree completely, 5=agree 
completely).   
Control Variables. We include a number of measures commonly used in the analysis of firm-level 
innovation as controls. Control variables include annual firm research expenditures in millions of 
dollars (R&D) and firm size measured as total number of employees (Size). We would expect that 
larger in-house research expenditures would lead to greater patenting output (Henderson and 
Cockburn, 1996). In terms of size, most studies have reported a positive effect of size on innovation 
(Chaney and Devinney, 1992; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), while others have shown a negative effect 
(Mansfield, 1968), or no effect at all (Clark, Chew, & Fujimoto, 1987). We also include the age of the 
firm (Age) which is calculated using the founding date available in the Capital IQ database. Similarly, 
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to size, prior research on the effects of age on innovation have been mixed (Sorensen and Stuart, 
2000). In addition to the above, we include environmental variables such as munificence, instability 
and regulation that could influence firm innovation and sector dummy variable to account for 
industry effects.  We also incorporate various individual controls to account for the characteristics of 
the respondents which may influence how they perceive complexity inside their organization. These 
are the hierarchical level of the respondent (number of layers below CEO), the tenure of the 
respondent inside the organization, and function dummy variable to account for differences in the 
work done by respondents.  Lastly, we include the number of industries the firm operates in and 
international diversification of the firm, to control for some of the objective (as opposed to 
subjectively experienced) dimensions of variety.   
Model Specification 
To test our hypotheses, we used OLS regression with Poisson estimation, because the dependent 
variable (number of patents) is a count variable taking on discrete nonnegative integer values, 
including zero.  We applied the following specification of a Poisson regression model: 
Log(Patentsi)= β0+βiXi 
where Patentsi is the expected number of patents assigned to firm i, and Xi is a vector of repressors 
containing the independent and control variables described above. In our Poisson regression, we 
also opted to obtain robust standard errors for the parameter estimates as recommended by 
Cameron and Trivedi (2009) to control for mild violation of the distribution assumption that the 
variance equals the mean. Furthermore, to allow for a meaningful comparison of the variables 
measured along different scales and to reduce potential collinearity, we standardized most of the 
control variables before entering them into the regression models.  
RESULTS 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics and the pair-wise correlation matrix for our measures. Since 
the sample includes firms from multiple industries, it is not surprising that there is considerable 
variance on all the key variables such as Patents, R&D, Size, and organizational complexity. We see 
that the average issued number of patents for the firms in our sample is 386 for 2007. The variables 
reflecting the hypothesized effects are not very highly correlated among themselves or with the 
control variables.  
----------Table 2---------- 
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Table 3 provides results for our main models using Poisson regression estimators (reported with 
empirical standard errors). The variables reflecting the hypothesized effects were entered into the 
regression individually and log-likelihoods are reported for all models. In the analysis presented, the 
number of patents applied in 2007 and published is the dependent variable. Model 1 in Table 3 
presents the base model in which environmental munificence, environmental instability, regulation, 
R&D expenditure, size, age, number of industries, international diversification, tenure, hierarchical 
level, sector and respondent function dummies were included as control variables. In models 2-5, we 
introduced variety, interdependencies, inefficient processes and unclear accountabilities to assess 
those variables' effects on innovation.  
In Hypothesis 1, we propose that variety of elements has a positive relationship with firm-level 
innovation. This hypothesis was supported, since the linear coefficient for variety in model 2 and 
model 5 is positive and significant. Hypothesis 2 proposes a positive linear relationship between 
interdependencies and innovation. In model 3 and model 5 in Table 3, the coefficient for 
interdependencies is positive and significant as expected, supporting our second hypothesis. In 
Hypothesis 3 and 4, we predict that inefficient processes and unclear accountabilities have a 
negative relationship with innovation output. Both of these hypotheses are supported (model 4 and 
5). In terms of elasticities of patent counts to our independent variables, we calculate incident rate 
ratios (IRR values) which are equal to exponentiated coefficients from the output in final model 5 in 
Table 3. We find that the incident rate of firm-level innovation increases by 42% and 67% for every 
unit increase in variety and interdependencies, while the incident rate of firm-level innovation 
decreases by 44% and 37% for every unit increase in inefficient processes and unclear 
accountabilities respectively.   
The effects of the control variables were mostly in line with our expectations and here we discuss 
only a few of them. The strong result that older firms patent more is not surprising given that 
previous streams of research found that organizational competence may improve over time (March, 
1991; Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Stinchcombe, 1965). Thus, if the passage of time leads to an 
accumulation of foundational knowledge, organizational competence will increase with age. 
Similarly, we discover that the executive tenure has a positive and significant relationship with 
innovation in line with Waldman, Ramirez, House and Puranam (2001) who found that executive 
tenure had a positive relationship with profit margins. Long tenures are associated with strategic 
persistence to a course of action (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990) and therefore could have a 
positive influence on firm innovation.  
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We also conducted an additional analysis in which all the different elements of organizational 
complexity were bundled together as a single construct (with all elements equally weighted).  This 
was, in essence, a test of our underlying proposition that it would be useful to decompose 
organizational complexity into structural and experienced components.   As model 6 shows, this 
“catch all” construct had a positive but non-significant relationship with firm-level innovation, which 
is broadly consistent with Damanpour’s (1989) meta-analysis and provides further support for our 
conceptual approach here. 
Robustness tests We ran several sensitivity tests to check the robustness of the results. One possible 
concern with our analysis was that the one-year lag between 2006 (when the questionnaire data 
was collected) and 2007 (for the dependent variable) was not appropriate.  We therefore collected 
patent filing data also for 2006, 2008, 2009 and 2010.  For the 2006 data, the results were entirely 
consistent with what is reported in table 2; for the years 2008-2010 the results were similar but not 
identical. Specifically, using the 2008 data provided support for Hypotheses 2-4, the 2009 provided 
support for Hypotheses 1-3, and the 2010 provided support for Hypotheses 1-2.   
We also considered other possible firm-level outcome variables, as there are often some concerns 
raised about the validity of patent data as a measure of innovation.  As shown in Table 4, we 
estimated the main model while including all four elements of organizational complexity, but using 
two different dependent variables: (1) sales growth in 2007 (one-year time lag) and (2) a subjective 
measure of value creation (specifically, a questionnaire item, “how effective do you believe this firm 
has been at creating value?” 1-5 scale).  These models yielded findings that were broadly consistent 
with our findings above. In Model 7 (sales growth), the coefficient for unclear accountabilities was 
significant at p=.12, and in Model 8 (value creation), the coefficient for variety of elements was 
significant at p=.26. All other coefficients were significant at levels below p =.05 and in the predicted 
direction. 
----------Table 4---------- 
We tested the strength of the results by relaxing the assumption that our data fits Poisson’s 
statistical distribution. To accomplish this, we estimated OLS and negative binomial model of our 
main model. The OLS and negative binomial results again exhibited very similar pattern as the 
original results indicating that the results of our hypotheses testing are robust. These last results are 
not included and are available upon request.  
We also explored whether there were more complex patterns in the data than predicted by our 
hypotheses, so we looked first at possible curvilinear relationships between the independent and 
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dependent variables, as there are arguments in the literature about diminishing returns to increases 
in complexity.  We added squared terms for each of the four independent variables, one at a time, 
to model 5.  However, none of these turned out to be significant.  We also explored the possibility of 
interaction terms between our independent variables, on the basis that these various elements of 
experienced organizational complexity might work together. However, again, none of the possible 
interactions were significant so we do not include the results here (available on request from the 
authors).  
Even though we use widely accepted patent-based measures of firm’s innovative activity such as 
patent counts, we realize that patent counts do not reflect the importance, or novelty of a patent. 
Therefore, we also test our findings with the second metric of innovation that involves measuring 
the value of a patent by counting the number of citations a patent has received following its 
approval. The results are presented in Table 5 and they confirm our initial findings.  
----------Table 5---------- 
In terms of understanding causality, a time-lagged dependent variable does not rule out the 
possibility of reverse causality, i.e. more innovative firms may choose to create greater complexity.  
But, again, there is an important nuance.  It seems highly likely that being innovative would cause a 
firm to create additional variety (H1) and build interdependencies between parts of the firm (H2), 
but it seems less likely that being innovative would cause a firm directly to increase the clarity of its 
accountabilities (H3) or the efficiency of its processes (H4).  The likelihood of reverse causality being 
an issue, in other words, varies by hypothesis, and in our view the findings for H3 and H4 are less 
susceptible to alternative explanations than the findings for H1 and H2. Nonetheless, we are fully 
aware that this study remains a correlational and not causal analysis.  
In sum, the research design (i.e. a cross-sectional, cross-industry survey) that allowed us to answer 
our research questions also led to some inevitable challenges in interpretation of our results.  We 
addressed these challenges by conducting additional statistical tests wherever possible, and by 
working through possible alternative interpretations, and accepting that some limitations remain. 
Hopefully, future research in this area will address some of these limitations using other designs and 
methods.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
Our primary contribution in this paper is conceptual, in that we operationalize a new construct, 
experienced complexity, which allows us to look at an established phenomenon (organizational 
complexity) in a new way.  We therefore do not build on structural contingency theory or complexity 
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theory per se; rather, we offer a complementary view, focusing on the individual-level perspective, 
which potentially provides new insights into the phenomenon that were not available before. 
Our theoretical approach was inspired to a large degree by the increasing interest in the 
microfoundations of organizations, which are “the underlying individual-level and group-level 
actions that shape strategy, organization, and, more broadly, dynamic capabilities, and lead to the 
emergence of superior organization-level performance” (Eisenhardt, Furr and Bingham, 2010: 1263).  
This perspective can be traced back to March and Simon (1958), Nelson and Winter (1982) and 
others, and it has become increasingly attractive as a way of shedding light on the mechanisms 
through which firm-level behaviour emerges (Devinney, 2013).  Our approach here was to apply this 
microfoundational logic to the study of organizational complexity.   We argued that complexity is to 
a large degree “in the eye of the beholder,” and the way decision-makers in organizations sense and 
interpret the stimuli in their task environment shapes their subsequent action (Daft and Weick, 
1984; Weick, 1979), and thereby generates meaningful consequences at the level of the organization 
as a whole.  This approach opens up some interesting avenues for further research.  For example, it 
would be interesting to examine further the difference between structural and experienced 
complexity: are some organizations objectively complex, but sufficiently well-managed that they 
allow people to work in a streamlined and non-challenging way? And are there other organizations 
that create experienced complexity in the eyes of their employees, even though they are actually 
doing relatively simple and non-challenging work?    Equally, it would be interesting to understand 
the conditions that create experienced complexity:  is it the immediate working environment, as 
shaped by the organization’s leaders, or the external operating environment, that is more 
important? These are important questions, complementary to the ones investigated here, that 
should be explored carefully in future research projects. 
Our second contribution is the operational separation we made between structural and experienced 
complexity. At an intuitive level, this distinction may seem obvious, but it is interesting to observe 
how little consideration previous researchers have given to the experienced aspects of complexity.   
This, we suspect, is in large part because it represents a form of “bad management” that is not part 
of the dialogue in many bodies of theory. Adler and Borys (1996: 66) made a similar observation 
when discussing the costs and benefits of formalization: “Organization theory has had little to say, 
however, about the criteria that shape subordinates’ assessments of rules as “good” and “bad”. To 
the extent that such a distinction is made in the literature, it is as untheorized common sense.” 
Our view is that rather than ignore the unintended complexity that arises from unclear 
accountabilities and inefficient systems, we should attempt to build it into our frameworks – both 
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because it explains variation in firm-level outcomes such as patenting, and because it can be 
manipulated by those running the organization (Moran and Ghoshal, 1996).  Again, some interesting 
future research directions are immediately suggested.  For example, why is there often a gap 
between the way management structures and processes were designed to work and how they 
actually work? Is the problem one of poor execution, i.e. a lack of effective follow-through from 
those designing the structures to those who implement them on a day-to-day basis?  Or are certain 
structures inherently more difficult or complex to operate than others?  Of course, these are not 
new questions – studies of modularity in organizational design, for example, provide a useful 
perspective on the trade-offs between complexity and flexibility (Baldwin and Clark, 2004; Ethiraj 
and Levinthal, 2004).  But by adding in the social dimension explicitly, i.e. in terms of how structures 
and processes are experienced by those working with them, there is room for significant advances to 
be made. 
The empirical evidence provided useful support for our theoretical arguments. It is interesting to 
note, first, that the two elements of structural complexity (variety of elements, interdependencies), 
mirror exactly the two dimensions used in NK models (Levinthal, 1997).  This may not seem 
surprising, but it is worth underlining that NK models are generally developed in a simulated setting, 
and they assume complexity to be a firm-level attribute, so it is perhaps reassuring to note that “N” 
and “K” both affect the extent to which decision-makers in organizations experience complexity and 
find their work challenging.  The empirical findings also support our theoretical framework nicely, 
with the experienced elements of complexity having negative relationships with firm-level 
innovation (patenting), and the structural elements having positive relationships. 
The results also offer some new perspectives on old findings. As noted earlier, when we aggregated 
all the dimensions of complexity together, the positive and negative effects essentially cancelled 
each other out, and we were left with a non-significant relationship between complexity and firm-
level innovation.  Damanpour’s (1996) meta-analysis suggested that a better understanding of the 
contingency factors affecting the complexity-innovation relationship was the best way forward.  Our 
study suggests a different logic: the effect of complexity does not just “depend” on certain external 
or internal contingencies; rather, it varies accordingly to how well the chosen approach to 
complexity has been implemented, to maximize its benefits and minimize its costs. 
Another interesting angle is to consider how our findings relate to the established notion of 
diseconomies of scale. It is well-established in the industrial organization literature that as a 
manufacturing operation grows, its economies of scale are gradually eroded and ultimately 
outweighed by its diseconomies of scale, such as bureaucratic insularity, communication distortion, 
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incentive limits and excessive specialization (Canback, Samouel and Price, 2006; Williamson, 1981). 
This argument assumes, essentially, a curvilinear relationship between complexity and performance. 
In other words, there are certain objective features of the firm that have a positive relationship with 
performance at low levels of output and a negative relationship at high levels of output.  Our 
approach does not in any way discredit this argument, but it hints at the possibility of disaggregating 
the elements of complexity so that the positive and negative effects could be analysed separately.  
This might help, for example, to understand why similar firms often have different cost curves, with 
some keeping the complexity of their manufacturing process in check at much higher levels than 
others.  
To conclude, our purpose in this paper was to put forward a new way of looking at complexity in 
organizations, by separating out experienced and structural forms of complexity, and how these 
shape subsequent actions.  However, much remains to be done, and we hope that these ideas and 
first empirical tests will stimulate others to build on our work and to establish the validity and 
efficacy of this new perspective. 
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Tables: 
Table 1a: Descriptive data for the sample (209 firms) 
 
 
Table 1b: Descriptive data for the sample (209 respondents) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sample Overview (209 firms)
Headquarters n of firms Business Sector n of firms Employees n of firms
North America 85 Manufacturing 46 <10,000 44
Europe 76 Telecom 37 10,000-50,000 80
As ia 40 IT 34 50,000-100,000 36
Rest of the world 8 Finance 32 >100,000 49
Pharma & Chemicals 24
Retai l 9
Other 27
Function n of respondents Tenure n of respondents Hierarchy level n of respondents
Finance 42 <2 21 -1 34
Sales 64 2-5 103 -2 55
R&D 9 6-9 85 -3 71
Manufacturing 22 >10 0 -4 49
Other 72
28 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics and Correlation Table 
  
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1. Patents 209 386 958 0.0 3484 1
2. Variety 209 2.9 0.7 1.2 4.9 0.20* 1
3. Interdependencies 209 2.7 0.6 1.3 4.4 0.07 0.03 1
4. Inefficient processes 209 3.1 0.9 1.0 5.0 -0.03 -0.08 0.02 1
5. Unclear accountabilities 209 2.9 0.5 1.0 4.2 -0.08 -0.06 -0.01 0.30* 1
6. Environ munificence 209 0.9 0.1 0.6 1.4 -0.01 0.09 0.00 0.00 -0.05 1
7. Eviron instability 209 1.2 0.1 1.1 2.5 -0.10 -0.03 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.13* 1
8. Regulation 209 3.6 0.8 1.0 5.0 0.01 0.12* 0.03 -0.10 -0.01 0.22* -0.08 1
9. Ln(Age) 209 3.8 1.0 1.0 6.5 0.23* 0.30* 0.00 0.05 -0.05 -0.04 0.04 0.03 1
10. Ln(R&D) 209 2.7 3.2 0.0 8.9 0.22* 0.27* -0.10 0.04 -0.02 -0.24* -0.16* -0.16 0.15* 1
11. Ln(Size) 209 3.3 1.5 0.0 6.6 0.22* 0.43* -0.01 0.07 -0.03 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.32* 0.41* 1
12. Number of industries 209 4.2 1.8 2.0 8.0 0.20* 0.19* -0.09 -0.12* -0.12 -0.01 -0.02 0.09 0.35* 0.41* 0.20* 1
13. Internat. diversification 209 0.7 0.6 -0.6 2.0 0.04 0.10 -0.04 0.07 0.04 -0.25* -0.10 -0.20* 0.43* 0.17* 0.12* 0.13* 1
14. Tenure 209 5.3 2.6 1.0 9.0 0.07 0.19* -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.08 0.00 -0.02 0.14* 0.20* 0.17* 0.10 0.05 1
15. Hierarchy level 209 2.7 1.0 1.0 4.0 -0.07 0.01 0.07 0.10 -0.04 0.14* -0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.13* 0.02 -0.07 0.07 1
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Table 3: Poisson regression results with Patents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DV: Patents Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Variety 0.396** 0.346** 0.350** 0.351**
(0.186) (0.176) (0.165) (0.169)
Interdependencies 0.427* 0.429* 0.514**
(0.235) (0.250) (0.249)
Inefficient processes -0.758*** -0.587**
(0.259) (0.272)
Unclear accountabilities -0.464**
(0.210)
Overall complexity 0.249
(0.331)
Environ munificence 2.170 2.238 2.392 2.503* 2.551** 2.279
(1.493) (1.508) (1.503) (1.333) (1.286) (1.581)
Eviron instability -1.335 -1.331 -1.527* -1.254 -1.599* -1.333
(0.886) (0.832) (0.848) (0.837) (0.890) (0.862)
Regulation -0.0509 -0.0856 -0.0517 -0.0551 -0.0444 -0.0518
(0.231) (0.216) (0.209) (0.191) (0.189) (0.234)
Ln (R&D) 0.0331 0.0355 0.0490 0.0351 0.0278 0.0413
(0.0471) (0.0479) (0.0464) (0.0449) (0.0439) (0.0441)
Ln (Size) 0.0968 0.0307 0.0161 -0.0112 -0.00405 0.0669
(0.104) (0.102) (0.0958) (0.0936) (0.0899) (0.111)
Ln (Age) 0.561** 0.534** 0.568** 0.619** 0.644* 0.571**
(0.152) (0.142) (0.143) (0.156) (0.167) (0.149)
Number of industries 0.122 0.120 0.0906 0.103 0.0842 0.112
(0.128) (0.127) (0.123) (0.109) (0.108) (0.126)
International diversification -0.256 -0.268 -0.188 -0.135 -0.101 -0.225
(0.392) (0.397) (0.419) (0.419) (0.394) (0.405)
Tenure 0.109** 0.101* 0.0986* 0.112** 0.117** 0.109**
(0.0554) (0.0534) (0.0542) (0.0498) (0.0535) (0.0547)
Hierarchical level -0.148 -0.121 -0.125 -0.0711 -0.0638 -0.143
(0.121) (0.116) (0.115) (0.116) (0.115) (0.117)
Constant -0.0909 -1.008 -1.804 -2.302 -2.187 -0.762
(1.900) (1.939) (1.961) (1.884) (1.883) (2.217)
Log likelihood -91886.085 -89567.393 -87053.149 -82399.747-79607.09 -99180.41
Observations 209 209 209 209 209 209
Sector Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included
Respondent Function Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: OLS regression results with Sales Growth and Value Capture 
  
 
 
 
 
Model 7 Model 8
DV: Sales Growth 2007 Value Capture
Variety 0.0400* 0.202
(0.0229) (0.179)
Interdependencies 0.0429* 0.328*
(0.0266) (0.190)
Inefficient processes -0.0493* -1.045***
(0.0292) (0.246)
Unclear accountabilities -0.0384 -0.743***
(0.0252) (0.192)
Environ munificence -0.00957 -0.933
(0.161) (1.216)
Eviron instability -0.0274 0.383
(0.0597) (1.043)
Regulation -0.0182 0.104
(0.0233) (0.147)
Ln (R&D) 0.00997* -0.00442
(0.00586) (0.0497)
Ln (Size) -0.00972 -0.0708
(0.0105) (0.0987)
Ln (Age) -0.0331** 0.111
(0.0167) (0.149)
Number of industries 0.0152 -0.0183
(0.0122) (0.102)
International diversification -0.0944** 0.145
(0.0407) (0.288)
Tenure -0.0107* 0.0154
(0.00587) (0.0483)
Hierarchical level 0.0105 0.112
(0.0147) (0.124)
Constant 0.236 4.674**
(0.185) (2.132)
R-squared 0.505 0.279
Log pseudolikelihood 
Observations 209 209
Sector Dummies Included Included
Respondent Function Dummies Included Included
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Poisson regression results with Citations 
 
 
 
 
 
DV: Citations Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14
Variety 0.360* 0.305* 0.308* 0.308*
(0.186) (0.176) (0.165) (0.170)
Interdependencies 0.455* 0.455* 0.539**
(0.235) (0.250) (0.251)
Inefficient processes -0.715*** -0.546**
(0.256) (0.269)
Unclear accountabilities -0.458**
(0.206)
Overall complexity 0.248
(0.331)
Environ munificence 2.217 2.262 2.431* 2.527* 2.565** 2.323
(1.475) (1.485) (1.475) (1.315) (1.271) (1.553)
Eviron instability -1.399 -1.379 -1.586* -1.324 -1.664* -1.394
(0.897) (0.843) (0.860) (0.852) (0.905) (0.872)
Regulation -0.0416 -0.0746 -0.0412 -0.0412 -0.0290 -0.0443
(0.226) (0.213) (0.206) (0.190) (0.188) (0.230)
Ln (R&D) 0.0339 0.0358 0.0502 0.0370 0.0303 0.0418
(0.0479) (0.0487) (0.0466) (0.0451) (0.0443) (0.0449)
Ln (Size) 0.0885 0.0298 0.0142 -0.0109 -0.00377 0.0589
(0.102) (0.102) (0.0947) (0.0926) (0.0894) (0.110)
Ln (Age) 0.567*** 0.541*** 0.578*** 0.627*** 0.650*** 0.577***
(0.150) (0.141) (0.143) (0.156) (0.166) (0.147)
Number of industries 0.133 0.130 0.0983 0.107 0.0885 0.123
(0.125) (0.124) (0.120) (0.108) (0.108) (0.123)
International diversification -0.283 -0.291 -0.207 -0.148 -0.122 -0.252
(0.380) (0.385) (0.408) (0.407) (0.383) (0.394)
Tenure 0.101* 0.0945* 0.0924* 0.104** 0.110** 0.101*
(0.0546) (0.0530) (0.0539) (0.0498) (0.0533) (0.0540)
CEO level -0.165 -0.141 -0.145 -0.0929 -0.0859 -0.160
(0.119) (0.115) (0.115) (0.116) (0.115) (0.115)
Constant 1.097 0.265 -0.580 -1.044 -0.909 0.432
(1.873) (1.915) (1.935) (1.848) (1.841) (2.191)
Log pseudolikelihood -266879.2 -261184.62 -254507.67 -241779.6 -234325.3 -265493.5
Observations 209 209 209 209 209 209
Sector Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included
Respondent Function Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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